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Are Poor People Worth Less Than Rich People? Disaggregating the Value of
Statistical Lives
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
Each government agency uses a uniform figure to measure the value of a
statistical life. This is a serious mistake. The very theory that underlies current practice
calls for far more individuation of the relevant values. According to that theory, the value
of statistical lives should vary across risks. More controversially, the value of a statistical
life should vary across individuals—even or especially if the result would be to produce a
lower number for some people than for others. One practical implication is that a higher
value should be given to programs that reduce cancer risks. Should government use a
higher VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the wealthy—and a lower VSL
for programs that disproportionately benefit the poor? A serious complication here is
that sometimes the beneficiaries of regulation pay only a fraction or even none of its cost;
when this is so, the appropriate VSL for poor people might be higher, on distributional
grounds, than market evidence suggests. An understanding of this point has implications
for foundational issues about government regulation, including valuation of persons in
poor and wealthy nations.
I.

Introduction

For over two decades, executive orders have required regulatory agencies to
engage in cost-benefit analysis of major regulations,1 and Congress has imposed the same
requirement in several statutes.2 To conduct cost-benefit analysis, agencies must assign
monetary values to human lives. What numbers do they choose? Do some deaths count
for more than others?

*

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and Department
of Political Science. I am grateful to participants in a work-in-progress lunch at the University of Chicago
Law School and to Matthew Adler, David Strauss, Robert Hahn, Eric Posner, Richard A. Posner, Adrian
Vermeule, and W. Kip Viscusi for valuable comments on a previous draft. Sarah Sulkowski provided
outstanding research assistance.
1
See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 120-35 (5th ed. 2002).
2
See, e.g., 15 USC 2601 et seq. (Toxic Substances Control Act); 7 USC 136 et seq. (Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); 42 USC 300g-1 (Safe Drinking Water Act).

1

The Environmental Protection Agency uses a uniform value for a statistical life
(VSL): $6.1million.3 Other agencies use either lower and higher numbers, with a range,
in recent years, between $1.5 million (the Federal Aviation Administration in 19904) to
the FDA’s current figure of $6.5 million.5 While substantial differences can be found
across agencies,6 uniformity is the intended practice within agencies.7 No agency treats
cancer risks, or mortality risks that produce unusual fear or involve special suffering, as
worthy of more concern than other risks. No agency treats young people as worth more
than poor people.8 No agency values the lives of poor people less than the lives of rich
3

See 66 Fed. Reg. at 7012. In its July 2003 regulation governing food labeling of trans fatty acids, the Food
and Drug Administration used a VSL of $6.5 million, see 68 Fed. Reg. 41434, 41488 (July 11, 2003); in its
March 13, 2003 proposed rule on dietary ingredients and dietary supplements, the same agency suggested a
VSL of $5 million, see 68 Fed. Reg. 12158, 12229 (using this value to calculate the “value of a statistical
life day”).
4
The Department of Transportation now uses a higher figure, but one that is still low in comparison to
what most agencies do. See 67 Fed. Reg. 17556, 17559 (April 10, 2002) ($2.7 million).
5
See Table 1 below; Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J Legal Stud 146 (2000).
6
These differences appear to be inexplicable.
7
See Adler and Posner, supra note. There are some differences within agencies across contexts and across
time, but those differences do not appear to be deliberate. See, e.g., the FDA sources cited in note 1 supra.
The most explicit discussions of varying VSL have come from the EPA. In its 2003 discussion of
hazardous air pollutants, see 68 Fed. Reg. 1660, 1693 (Jan. 13, 2003), the EPA noted that there “is general
agreement that the value to an individual of a reduction is mortality risk can vary based on several factors,
including the age of the individual, the type of risk, the level of control the individual has over the risk, the
individual’s attitude toward risk, and the health status of the individual.” Nonetheless, the agency
announced, without offering reasons, that it “prefers not to draw distinctions in the monetary value assigned
to the lives saved even if they differ in age, health status, socioeconomic status, gender or other
characteristic of the adult population.” Id.
An extended discussion of related issues can be found in the EPA’s arsenic proposal, see 65 Fed.
Reg. 38888, 38945 (June 22, 2000). There the EPA noted that the “factors which may influence the
estimate of economic benefits associated with avoided cancer fatalities include (1) a possible ‘cancer
premium’ (i.e., the additional value or sum that people may be willing to pay to avoid the experiences of
dread, pain and suffering, and diminished quality of life associated with cancer-related illness and ultimate
fatality); (2) the willingness of people to pay more over time to avoid mortality risk as their income rises;
(3) a possible premium for accepting involuntary risks as opposed to voluntary [sic] assumed risks; (4) the
greater risk aversion of the general population as opposed to workers in the wage-risk valuation studies;
(5) ‘altruism’ or the willingness of people to pay more to reduce risk in other sectors of the population and
(6) a consideration of health status and life years remaining at the time of premature mortality.” The EPA
acknowledged that these factors “may significantly increase the present value estimate,” but said that “there
is currently neither a clear consensus among economists about how to simultaneously analyze each of these
adjustments nor is there adequate empirical data to support quantitative estimates for all potentially
significant adjustment factors.” Id. Hence the EPA solicited comments on these issues and said that it
would ask its Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to conduct a review. Id. As noted below, the comments
produced a sensitivity analysis that contains several 7% upward adjustments from the $6.1 million figure,
see below, but the SAB’s review suggested that at the present time, upward adjustments were not justified
by existing evidence, see below.
8
With the interest in focusing on “life-years,” however, this might change. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lives,
Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, Colum L Rev (forthcoming 2004).
2

people. No agency distinguishes between whites and African-Americans or between men
and women. For statistical lives, the governing idea is that each life is worth exactly the
same. With respect to cost-benefit analysis, much is disputed.9 But on the idea of a
uniform value per life saved, there is a solid consensus, at least in terms of regulatory
practice.10
I intend to question that consensus here, and to do so in a way that raises
foundational issues about the economic valuation of human lives. I suggest that a uniform
value is obtuse. Under the very approach that agencies use to produce the current
numbers, the value of a statistical life should vary along two dimensions. First, it should
vary across risks. For example, there is reason to think that VSL is higher for cancer
deaths than for sudden, unanticipated deaths11; deaths that produce unusual fear,12 or that
are accompanied by high levels of pain and suffering, should be expected to produce a
higher VSL. Human beings face countless mortality risks, and it would be truly bizarre to
maintain that for each of these risks, VSL is identical. Second, VSL should vary across
individuals.13 People who are risk averse will show a higher VSL than people who are
risk-seeking.14 People who are thirty will show a higher VSL than people who are sixty.15

9

For various perspectives, see Adler and Posner, supra note; W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1994); Frank
Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless (2004).
10
An arguable exception, noted below, involves the debate over whether agencies should focus on lives or
instead life-years; the latter approach might well value older people less than younger ones. For discussion,
see Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, Colum L Rev (forthcoming 2004). An
implicit challenge to the consensus can be found in W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, J Legal Stud. W. Kip
Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates
Throughout the World, 27 J Risk and Uncertainty 5, 7 (2003), notes the existence of heterogeneity by
income, union status, and age, and explains that the “existence of such heterogeneity provides a cautionary
note for policy.”
11
See James K. Hammitt and Jin-Tau Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value of Mortality
Risk, 28 J Risk and Uncertainty 73 (2004) (finding that willingness to pay to reduce a cancer death is about
one-third larger WTP to reduce risk of a similar chronic, degenerative disease).
12
For evidence of a higher VSL for airline risks than for automotive risks, see Fredrik Carlsson et al., Is
Transport Safety More Valuable in the Air?, 28 J Risk and Uncertainty 147 (2004).
13
See Viscusi and Aldy, supra note, at 18 (“transferring the estimates of a value of a statistical life to nonlabor market contexts, as is the case in benefit-cost analyses of environmental health policies for example,
should recognize that different populations have different preferences over risks and different values on
life-saving”).
14
See Carlsson et al., supra note, at 158 (finding that those who are scared of flying are willing to pay
especially high amounts to reduce the risks of flying).
15
As found in Joseph P. Aldy and W. Kip Viscusi, Age Variations in Workers’ Value of a Statistical Life
(2003), forthcoming.
3

Those who are rich will show a higher VSL than those who are poor. It follows that
different demographic groups will show diversity in their VSL as well.16
If we put together these two forms of variability—across risks and across
persons—we will find that the unitary $6.1 million figure is far too crude. In theory, each
person in society should have a particular VSL for each and every risk, resulting in a
fully individuated VSL.17 Such a fully individuated VSL would mean, for example, that
the VSL of some racial groups would likely be lower than that for others.18 But these
differences would not be the result of a governmental decision to take racial
characteristics into account; in fact it would not be a product of any kind of group-level
discrimination on government’s part, at least not when government is calculating VSL.19
The differences would be the result of aggregating fully individual VSLs, just as ordinary
markets do in producing prices for the reduction of the statistical risks associated with
smoke alarms, unusually safe cars, and much more.20

16

Such differences are found in W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of a Statistical
Life, 27 J. Risk & Uncertainty 239, 252 tbl.5 (2003) [hereinafter Viscusi, Racial Differences]. To get a bit
ahead of the story: I am not arguing that government should assign a higher VSL to white lives than to
African-American lives. I am speaking here of demographic differences that would emerge from a fully
individuated approach to VSL, in which each person’s WTP were calculated on an individual basis; once
these values are aggregated, the white VSL would likely be higher than the African-American VSL, simply
because of disparities in wealth and income. Richer people pay more for safe cars and smoke alarms than
poor people do. See below for further discussion.
17
I am putting to one side the complication that sometimes values are constructed, rather than elicited, by
social situations – an especially serious complication for contingent valuation studies. See John Payne et
al., Measuring Constructed Preferences: Toward a Building Code, 19 J. Risk and Uncertainty 243 (1999);
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron, 70 U Chi L Rev 1159,
1177-1178 (2003).
18
As found in W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of a Statistical Life, 27 J Risk
and Uncertainty 239 (2003); John D. Leeth and John Ruser, Compensating Wage Differentials for Fatal and
Nonfatal Injury Risk by Gender and Race, 27 J Risk and Uncertainty 257 (2003). Viscusi finds that the
overall white VSL is $15 million, while the overall African-American VSL is $7.2 million. For white
females, the overall VSL is $9.4 million, compared to $18.8 million for white males; for African-American
females, the overall VSL is $6.9 million, compared to $5.9 million for African-American males.
19
Discrimination might well lay in the background, of course; it almost certainly accounts for the unequal
opportunities that produce lower VSL for African-Americans than for whites. See Viscusi, supra note, at
255, for the suggestion that the racial differentials reflect “differences in market opportunities.” Viscusi
goes on to suggest that “it is inappropriate to attribute the observed differences to a greater willingness by
black workers to bear risk.” Id. In a sense Viscusi is correct; there is no reason to think that AfricanAmerican workers have an intrinsically greater predisposition to take risks. But in the market, one’s
willingness to bear risks is a product of “market opportunities,” and hence those with fewer opportunities
will show a greater willingness to bear risk.
20
See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1994).
4

In practice, of course, a fully individuated VSL is not feasible, for two different
reasons. First, government lacks the information that would permit the calculation.
Regulators do not know how much each person would be willing to pay to reduce each
statistical risk; categories are therefore inevitable. Second, many regulatory programs
involve collective goods and therefore must protect many people at once. A clean air
program, for example, cannot easily ensure that some people in a geographical region are
exposed to no more than 10 parts per billion (ppb) of some pollutant, while others in the
same region are subjected to 50 ppb. Because collective goods are typically involved in
regulation, the problem is pervasive.
Notwithstanding issues of feasibility, an understanding of the reasons for
individuating VSL is important for two reasons. The first involves conceptual clarity. The
theory behind the use of VSL and willingness to pay (WTP) remains poorly understood.
An appreciation of the case for individuation will clarify the theory—both its rationale
and its limitations, empirical and ethical. The second reason involves the possibility of
moving some way in the direction of greater individuation. With respect to cancer risks,
for example, there is reason to believe that VSL is significantly higher than the amounts
produced by examining studies of workplace accidents. For this reason, the government’s
current numbers for cancer risks might well be too low, resulting in widespread
underprotection of the public. Similarly, there is reason to think that VSL should be
higher for mortality risks from airplanes than for statistically identical risks on the
highways.21 More generally, different agencies, dealing with qualitatively different risks,
might well use different VSLs, simply because market evidence is likely to show just
those differences. Full individuation is not feasible, but greater individuation would be
quite easy.
A far more troublesome point, to which I will devote considerable attention,
involves disparities along demographic lines. For now, notice a simple factual point:
When risks are faced disproportionately by wealthy people, VSL, based on actual WTP,
should be higher than $6.1 million—just as it should be lower when it is faced

21

See Carlsson, supra note (finding that people’s WTP for airline deaths is more than double their WTP for
taxi deaths).
5

disproportionately by poor people.22 WTP is dependent on ability to pay, and those with
little income and wealth will show little WTP. It follows that people in poor nations will
have a lower VSL than people in rich nations, a point with implications for valuation of
the harms from global warming23—and that people in poor areas will have a lower VSL
than those in wealthy areas, a point with implications for valuation of multiple risks in the
domestic setting. If variations across risks and persons are significant, the question of
individuation should be a central part of the second generation of cost-benefit analysis—a
step beyond the first generation debate about whether to do such analysis at all, and a step
toward doing such analysis in a way that is more refined and more closely attuned to the
consequences of regulations in terms of both welfare and distributional equity.
Of course it is offensive and wrong to suggest that in principle, poor people are
“worth less” than rich people. If poor people are subject to a risk of 1/10,000, they do not
have less of a claim to public attention than if wealthy people are subject to the same risk;
in fact they have a greater claim, if only because they lack the resources to reduce that
risk on their own. But the topic here is regulation rather than subsidy, and the two ought
not to be confused. In principle, government should not force people to buy protection
against statistical risks at a price that seems to them excessive.24 Someone should not be
required to pay $70 to reduce a risk of 1/100,000 if she is willing to pay no more than
$50. The point bears on international issues as well as domestic ones. If a uniform VSL
would benefit the poor, there is an argument for a uniform VSL. But regulation based on
a uniform VSL may or may not produce a better distribution of income; in fact any
redistribution may be perverse, and a single VSL might not promote equality at all. If
wealthy people are the principal beneficiaries of a particular regulation chosen on the
basis of a uniform VSL, and if the public as a whole pays for it, then any redistribution
will benefit the wealthy, not the poor. And if poor people are forced to pay an amount for
risk reduction that exceeds their WTP, desirable redistribution will hardly result; forced
exchanges, on terms that people reject, are not a good way of redistributing wealth to the
disadvantaged. On the other hand, it is possible that some regulatory programs, based on
22

With this qualification: If poor people would be disproportionately benefited by assigning them a higher
VSL, then there is a good argument for assigning them a higher VSL. I explore this issue below.
23
See below.
24
I offer a number of qualifications below. See TAN infra.
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a uniform VSL, will help those in need, if their beneficiaries receive risk reduction for
which they pay little or nothing—an issue to which I will devote considerable attention.
A larger lesson follows. For purposes of law and politics, there is no sensible
answer to the abstract question about the correct monetary value of human life. Any
judgment about the appropriate VSL, and about individuation, must be heavily
pragmatic; it must rest on the consequences of one or another choice. Whether
government should use a higher or lower VSL across demographic lines cannot be
answered simply. An important implication involves the assessment of VSL across
nations. A poor nation would do well to adopt a lower VSL than a wealthy nation; for
China or India, it would be disastrous to use a VSL equivalent to that of the United States
or Canada. But this point should not be taken to support the ludicrous proposition that for
donor institutions, both public and private, risk reduction in a wealthy nation deserves
more attention than equivalent risk reduction in a poor nation.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II clarifies the theory behind the
valuation of statistical lives. The major point here is that regulators do not really use a
VSL; instead they use a mean WTP to eliminate a statistical risk. For example, agencies
might say that they are using a VSL of $6 million, but if so, they are relying on evidence
more or less establishing that the average person pays, or is paid, $60 to eliminate a risk
of 1/10,000. Part III, in some ways the heart of the essay, explores the need for
individuation across both risks and persons. Part IV offers a more ambitious discussion of
the uses and limits of willingness to pay in regulatory policy. It distinguishes between
easy and hard cases for using WTP. The central claim here is that the argument for using
WTP is strongest when the beneficiaries of regulation must pay all of its cost—though
even in that event, the argument is subject to important qualifications, above involving
bounded rationality. The argument for using WTP is weaker when the beneficiaries of
regulation pay only a fraction of that cost. In the latter circumstances, some people will
benefit from regulation even if it is inefficient in economic terms. I discuss the
implications of this point for a uniform or fully individuated VSL.

7

II.

WTP: Theory and Practice

It has now become standard for regulatory agencies to assign monetary values to
human lives. Consider the following table, which captures agency practices from 1996
through 2003:
Table 1: Agency Values of Life, 1996–2003
Agency
Dept of Transportation/Federal
Motor Carrier Safety
Administration

Dept. of Health & Human
Services/FDA

Dept. of Agriculture Food
Safety and Inspection Service

Dept. of Health & Human
Services/FDA

Office of Management and
Budget

EPA

EPA

EPA

EPA

Regulation and Date
Safety Requirements for Operators of Small
Passenger-Carrying Commercial Motor
Vehicles Used in Interstate Commerce
August 12, 2003
68 FR 47860-01
Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition
Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health
Claims
July 11, 2003
68 FR 41434-01
Control of 1Listeria Monocytogenes in Readyto-Eat Meat and Poultry Products
June 6, 2003
68 FR 34208-01
Labeling Requirements for Systemic
Antibacterial Drug Products Intended for
Human Use
February 6, 2003
68 FR 6062-01
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of
Federal Regulations
February 3, 2003
68 FR 5492-01
Control of Emissions from Nonroad Large
Spark-Ignition Engines, and Recreational
Engines (Marine & Land-Based)
November 8, 2002
67 FR 68242-01
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations:
Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and
New Source Contaminants Monitoring
January 22, 2001
66 FR 6976-01
Control of Air Pollution from New Motor
Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur
Control Requirements
January 18, 2001
66 FR 5002-01
Control of Air Pollution from New Motor
Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions
Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control

8

Value of Statistical Life

$3 million

$6.5 million

$4.8 million

$5 million

$5 million

$6 million

$6.1 million

$6 million

$5.9 million

EPA

EPA

EPA

Dept. of Transportation/FAA

Dept. of Health & Human
Services/FDA

Dept. of Health & Human
Services/FDA

Dept. of Agriculture/Food
Safety & Inspection Service

Dept. of Transportation/FAA

Consumer Product Safety
Commission
Consumer Product Safety
Commission

Requirements
February 10, 2000
65 FR 6698-01
Findings of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking on Section 125 Petitions for
Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone
Transport
January 18, 2000
65 FR 2674-01
Final Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Hazardous Waste Combustors
September 30, 1999
64 FR 52828-01
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations:
Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts
December 16, 1998
63 FR 69390-01
Financial Responsibility Requirements for
Licensed Launch Activities
August 26, 1998
63 FR 45592-01
Quality Mammography Standards
October 28, 1997
62 FR 55852-01
Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents
August 28, 1996
61 FR 44396-01
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems
July 25, 1996
61 FR 38806-01
Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in Pilot Training,
Testing and Checking and at Training Centers
July 2, 1996
61 FR 34508-01
Requirements for Labeling of Retail Containers
of Charcoal
May 3, 1996
61 FR 19818-01
Large Multiple-Tube Fireworks Devices
March 26, 1996
61 FR 13084-01

$5.9 million

$5.6 million

$5.6 million

$3 million

$2 - 3 million

$2.5 million

$1.6 million

$2.7 million

$5 million

$3 - $7 million

These number show substantial variations, though less so than even ten years
25

ago. The variations appear not to have any rationale behind them; agencies with higher
or lower numbers have not explained their choices. The prior question is how agencies
25

See Adler and Posner, supra note, for a slightly dated report that shows larger disparities.
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generate monetary amounts of this kind. The answer comes from two kinds of evidence.
The first and most important involves real-world markets, producing evidence of
compensation levels for actual risks.26 In the workplace and for consumer goods,
additional safety has a price; market evidence is investigated to identify that price.27 The
second kind of evidence comes from contingent valuation studies, asking people how
much they are willing to pay to reduce statistical risks.28 The EPA’s $6.1 million is a
product of studies of actual workplace risks, attempting to determine how much workers
are paid to assume mortality hazards.29 The relevant risks usually are in the general range
of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000.30 The calculation of VSL is a product of simple arithmetic.
Suppose that workers must be paid $600, on average, to eliminate a risk of 1/10,000. If
so, the value of a statistical life would be said to be $6 million.
For some of the two dozen studies on which agencies currently rely,31 consider
the following table:32
Table 2: Value of Life Studies
Study
Kniesner and Leith (1991)
Smith and Gilbert (1984)
Dillingham (1985)
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982)
V.K. Smith (1976)
Viscusi (1981)
Leigh and Folsom (1984)
Leigh (1987)
Garen (1988)

Method
Labor market
Labor market
Labor market
Labor market
Labor market
Labor market
Labor market
Labor market
Labor market

26

Value of Statistical Life
$0.7 million
$0.8 million
1.1 million
3.4 million
5.7 million
7.9 million
11.7 million
12.6 million
16.3 million

See W. Kip Viscusi, supra note.
A valuable and comprehensive overview can be found in Viscusi and Aldy, supra note.
28
See, e.g., James Hammitt and Jin-Tau Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value of
Mortality Risk, 28 J Risk and Uncertainty 73 (2004).
29
See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs, supra note, for discussion.
30
See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates With Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 Ec.
Inquiry 29, 33 (2004) (showing fatality risks ranging from about 1/100,000 to 45/100,000).
31
For an accessible outline, see Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U Chi L Rev 1345, 148586 (2003).
32
See EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses 89 (2000).
27
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A large advantage of labor market studies of this kind is that they avoid the lively
disputes over the use of “willingness to pay” or “willingness to accept” in regulatory
policy.33 In many contexts, people demand more to give up a good than they are willing
to pay to obtain it in the first instance—a disparity that much complicates efforts to
assign monetary values to regulatory benefits, including mortality and morbidity.34 If
people are willing to pay $25 to eliminate an existing risk of 1/100,000, but demand $100
to incur a new risk of 1/100,000, then it is difficult to know how to proceed for purposes
of monetary valuation of risks. Fortunately, this problem dissipates in the context of labor
market studies. If workers who face a risk of 1/10,000 are paid $600 more for doing so,
and if workers who refuse to face such a risk are being paid $600 less, then it is irrelevant
whether we speak in terms of WTP or WTA.
Nonetheless, some questions might be raised about the use of these studies by
EPA and other agencies.35 Most obviously, the studies show significant variety in the
crucial numbers, ranging from $0.7 million, in 1997 dollars, to $16.3 million. The EPA
has adopted the $6.1 million figure on the ground that it represents the median in the
relevant studies. But there is a risk of arbitrariness in fastening on that median figure,
certainly if we lack reason to believe that the relevant study is the most accurate. In fact a
more general look at the VSL data produces further puzzles and wider ranges. Some
studies find no compensating differentials at all, indicating a VSL of zero36—implausibly
low, to say the least, for purposes of policy. Others find that non-unionized workers
receive negative compensating differentials for risk, that is, they appear to be paid less
because they face mortality risks.37 Another study finds that African-Americans receive
no significant compensating wage differential and hence that their particular VSL is
zero.38 On the other hand, it is possible to find studies finding a VSL not below the range

33

See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1227 (2003).
See id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. Legal Stud. 217, 246-47
(1993).
35
See Parker, supra note, and Robert Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative
Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2001), for several such questions.
36
See Peter Dorman and P. Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work Revisited, 52 Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 116 (1998).
37
Viscusi and Aldy, supra note, at 44.
38
Leeth and Ruser, supra note.
34
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in Table 1 but above it; consider the finding that for people who choose jobs with low
level risks, the VSL is as much as $22 million.39
The most recent meta-study, far more comprehensive than EPA’s own analysis,
finds that most studies produce a range of between $3.8 million and $9 million.40 The
range is fairly compressed, in a way that disciplines agency decisions; for many
regulations, the “bottom line” of the cost-benefit assessment will not be affected by a
choice of $3.8 million or $9 million for VSL. But that range still leaves significant room
for discretion, in a way that would have significant implications for policy and law.
Consider the fact that the monetized value of a program that saves 200 lives would range
from $760 million to $1.8 billion; consider also the fact that the EPA’s highly publicized
arsenic regulation would easily fail cost-benefit analysis with a $3.8 million VSL but
easily pass with a $9 million VSL.41 The simple point is that the variety of the outcomes
raises questions about the reliability of any particular figure.
In addition, most of these studies on which EPA relies are based on data from the
1970s. Since that time, there has been significant growth in national income, in a way that
suggests that any VSL derived from 1970s data is too low. Of course people with more
money are expected to be willing to pay more, other things being equal, to reduce
statistical risks. One study finds that at the beginning of the twentieth century, VSL was
about $150,000 in current dollars—less than one-twentieth of the corresponding amount a
century later.42 On reasonable assumptions, the EPA’s use of 1970s data has produced a
significant undervaluation of the monetary value of the lives at stake, for the $6.1 million
figure reflects no adjustment to account for changes in national real income growth.43 In
principle, the failure to undertake an adjustment is a serious mistake. The actual amount
might be substantially higher.44
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Let us suppose that these problems can be solved and that we can identify a
number, call it $6 million, that really represents people’s valuations. It should be clear
that even if this were so, it is grossly misleading to offer the following suggestion: The
value of a statistical life is $6 million. It would be much more accurate to say that for
risks of 1/10,000, the median WTP, in the relevant population, is $600—or that for risks
of 1/100,000, the median WTP is $60. If true, these statements would, on assumptions to
be explored, be extremely helpful for purposes of policy. But even at first glance, we can
see that these numbers need not be taken to support a VSL that is independent of
probability.45 Suppose that people would be willing to pay $60 to reduce a risk of
1/100,000. From this it does not follow that people would be willing to pay $6 to
eliminate a risk of 1/1 million, or $6000 to reduce a risk of /1000, or $60,000 to reduce a
risk of 1/100. It is plausible to think that people’s WTP to reduce statistical risks is
nonlinear.46 As the probability approaches 100%, people become willing to pay an
amount for risk reduction that arises nonlinearly to 100% of their income; as the risk
approaches 0%, WTP nonlinearly approaches nothing. For a risk of 1 in 1million, for
example, many reasonable people would be willing to pay zero, treating that risk as
inconsequential.
Hence the claim that VSL is $6.1 million is merely a shorthand way of saying that
people are willing to pay from $600 to $60 to eliminate risks of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000.
Since this is the range for risks with which most agencies deal, the relevant data is highly
informative. For current purposes, this point is the crucial one.
III.

Individuation

My basic claim is that VSL will inevitably vary across both risks and persons. If
people’s WTP is higher to avoid cancer risks than risks of unanticipated, sudden deaths,
then the use of a VSL, drawn from studies of the latter risks, will ensure insufficient
Differences], finding values as high as $15.1 million in the case of white males. In the context of arsenic
regulation, the EPA also noted in its sensitivity analysis that the appropriate adjustment would increase the
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45
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protection of the exposed population. If people in different occupations are paid different
amounts to incur a risk, then use of an uniform VSL will not track actual behavior, which
is what it is supposed to do.47 If wealthy people show a higher WTP than poor people,
then a uniform WTP, based on a population-wide median, will ensure insufficient
protection of wealthy people and excessive protection of poor people—in a way that
might well prove harmful to both groups.48
To test these issues in a highly preliminary way, I conducted a small contingent
valuation study. Eighty-four University of Chicago law students were asked about their
WTP to eliminate each of five risks of 1/100,000. The simplest of these risks involved
dying from an automobile accident as a result of a defective brake. The four other risks
might be expected to occasion greater concern; they involved deaths from lung cancer,
AIDS, Alzheimer’s disease, and dying in an airplane crash as a result of a terrorist attack.
The 1/100,000 risk of dying in an automobile accident produced a mean WTP of $156,
whereas the four other accidents produced significantly higher amounts (ranging from
$184 for the AIDS risk to $193 for Alzheimer’s disease). In addition, there was
substantial heterogeneity across individuals. For each of the questions, about ten
respondents were willing to pay nothing to eliminate the 1/100,000 risk, producing a VSL
of 0. And for each of them, about fifteen people were willing to pay at least $500 to
eliminate the 1/100,000 risk, producing a VSL of $50 million. Let us now turn to the
possibility of substantial diversity across both risks and persons.
A. Risks
I have emphasized that the data that underlies the $6.1 million figure comes from
risks of accidents in the workplace—and that even if this data can be generalized, it
would not justify a probability-independent VSL. But there is a point of greater practical
importance. A 1/100,000 risk of dying in a workplace accident might well produce a
different WTP from a 1/100,000 risk of dying of cancer from air pollution, which might
in turn be different from a 1/100,000 risk of dying in an airplane as a result of a terrorist
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attack, and that number might in turn by different from a 1/100,000 risk of dying as a
result of a defective snowmobile. The very theory that lies behind the government’s
current use of VSL justifies a simple conclusion: VSL should be risk-specific; it should
not be the same across statistically equivalent risks. The use of a single number almost
certainly produces significant blunders.
1. Data. Notice initially that the very category of “workplace risks” conceals
relevant differences. The American economy contains a wide range of occupations and
industries, and a uniform VSL should not be expected to emerge from each of them.
Indeed, a recent study finds significant differences across both occupations and
industries,49 with blue collar workers showing a higher VSL than others.50 It is inevitable
that a wide range of values would emerge from studies that looked separately at machine
operators, executive positions, sales, dental technicians, equipment cleaners, security
guards, and secretaries51—and undoubtedly diverse values could be found within each
category.
In addition, many risks controlled by the EPA are qualitatively different from the
workplace risks that EPA has used to generate its VSL. Two differences are particularly
important. First, the workplace studies do not involve cancer, and cancer risks are often
involved in environmental decisions. There is considerable evidence that the risks
associated with cancer produce a higher WTP than other kinds of risk.52 For example,
Hammit and Liu find that in Taiwan, willingness to pay to eliminate a cancer risk is about
one-third larger than WTP to avoid a risk of a similar, chronic degenerative disease.53
Some contingent valuation studies suggest that people are willing to pay twice as much to
prevent a cancer death as an instantaneous death.54 People seem to have a special fear of
cancer, and they seem to be willing to pay more to prevent a cancer death than a sudden
unanticipated death, or a death from heart disease.55 The “cancer premium” might be
49
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produced by the “dread” nature of cancer; it seems well-established that dreaded risks
produce special social concern, holding the statistical risk constant.56
To be sure, existing evidence on this count is not unambiguous. One study of
occupational exposures does not find a significantly higher VSL for cancer risks.57 But
that study assumes that occupational cancers account for 10-20 percent of all cancer
deaths—an amount that is almost certainly too high. If occupational exposures account
for 5% of all cancers—a far more realistic number—then the VSL for cancer risks may
be as high as $12 million, about double the amount that EPA now uses. The current
findings conflict58; but in principle, the VSL figures should be risk-specific, and we know
enough to suspect that cancer risks produce an unusually high VSL.
The second difference between workplace risks and the risks that concern EPA is
that the latter risks seem peculiarly involuntary and uncontrollable.59 Unlike the risks of
workplace accidents, pollution risks are not assumed voluntarily in return for
compensation.60 A great deal of literature suggests that involuntary, dread,
uncontrollable, and potentially catastrophic risks produce unusually high levels of public
concern.61 If so, the numbers that derive from workplace accidents will substantially
understate willingness to pay for regulatory benefits provided by the EPA and many other
agencies as well.62
The implications go well beyond the distinction between workplace accidents and
environmental risks. For example, people appear to be willing to pay far more to produce
safety in the air than to produce safety on the highways63; it follows that VSL should be
higher for the Federal Aviation Administration than for the National Highway Traffic
56
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Safety Administration. Oddly, the former agency has an unusually low rather than an
unusually high VSL.64 Some diseases would produce a higher VSL than others. A
1/100,000 risk of death from Alzheimer's disease, for example, would almost certainly
produce a higher VSL than 1/100,000 risk of death from a heart attack; 1/50,000 risk of
an AIDS death would not produce the same VSL as a 1/50,000 risk of death from a
defective brake system on an automobile; most people would pay more to reduce a risk of
dying from slow-acting strokes than from strokes that kill outright. There should be a
distinctive population-wide median VSL for mortality risks of airplane accidents, of
cancer from air pollution, of motor vehicle accidents, of defective toys, of cancer from
water pollution.
In fact studies have been done for seatbelt use, automobile safety, home fire
detectors, and more, and they find a wide variety of numbers, with a VSL ranging from
$770,000 (smoke detectors, based on data in the 1970s) to $9.9 million (fatality risks
associated with safety belts and motorcycle helmets).65 And within each of these
categories, further distinctions would undoubtedly emerge. All cancer fatalities are not
the same; informed people would surely make distinctions between those that involve
long periods of suffering and those that do not. If we are really interested in basing VSL
on WTP, a uniform number, treating all statistically identical mortality risks as the same,
is fatally obtuse.
2. Practice. These claims are not entirely foreign to current regulatory policy. In
the context of arsenic regulation, the EPA was alert to some of them.66 Hence its own
sensitivity analysis for arsenic suggested the need for an upward revision of 7%, because
of the involuntariness and uncontrollability of the risk.67 With this revision, along with
the revision for income growth, the value of a statistical life would rise from $6.1 million
to $7.2 million.68 In fact there are reasons to suggest that this amount might be far too
low. Dean Revesz suggests that “the value of avoiding a death from an involuntary,
carcinogenic risk should be estimated as four times as large as the value of avoiding an
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instantaneous workplace fatality.”69 If we take this approach, the VSL, in the context of
arsenic, jumps from $6.1 million to $24.3 million. I am not arguing that $24.3 million is
the correct number; I am suggesting only that VSL is almost certainly risk-specific.
3. Qualifications. Three qualifications are important. First, psychological studies
about heightened public concern70 may not translate into higher WTP. Social scientists
might be able to show that certain qualitative factors make people especially concerned
about certain risks, but it is an independent question whether and how much WTP
increase as a result. Fortunately, a number of studies of WTP contain at least suggestive
answers to that question, demonstrating that VSL does vary significantly across areas.71
Second, it is important not to think that there is a rigid dichotomy between the
involuntary/uncontrollable and the voluntary/controllable.72 This is a continuum, without
sharp divisions among various points, and hence it is a mistake to believe that risks can
be neatly separated into the two categories. Are the risks from air pollution in Los
Angeles involuntarily incurred? The answer might seem to be affirmative, but people
have a choice whether or not to live in Los Angeles. Are the risks of airplane travel
uncontrollable? Many people think so, but the decision to fly is itself under human
control. Death from an asteroid seems to be a model case of involuntariness, at an
opposite pole from hang-gliding. But why? In deciding whether a risk is faced
involuntarily, or whether it is within personal control, the underlying issues seem to be
whether those exposed to the risk are exposed knowingly and whether it is costly or
otherwise difficult for people to avoid the risk.73 When risks are approached in these
terms, it is clear that some risks are worse than others, even if the probability of harm is
identical. This point is enough to suggest that VSL cannot be uniform across risks.
Third, it is possible that extreme aversion to certain risks reflects a form of
bounded rationality74—and hence it is possible to doubt whether that extreme aversion
should be allowed to play a role in regulatory policy. Suppose, for example, that people
really are willing to pay twice as much to avoid a cancer risk as to avoid a sudden,
69

See Revesz, supra note 7, at 982.
See Slovic, supra note.
71
See Hammitt and Liu, supra note, and the meta-analysis in Viscusi and Aldy, supra note.
72
See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259 (1997).
73
See id.
74
See Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, supra note.
70

18

unanticipated death. Must these numbers be decisive for purposes of policy, assuming
that the contingent valuation study is reliable? They might not be if we have reason to
believe that the WTP figures are not accurately measuring welfare. And is it even
plausible to think that the “cancer premium” is so high that it actually doubles the cost of
death? Is it reasonable to think that a death from cancer is actually twice as bad as a death
that is sudden and unanticipated? To be sure, a degree of pain and suffering typically
accompanies cancer, and this point helps explain the obtuseness of using the same
number for cancer risks as for risks of sudden, unanticipated deaths. But it is not easy to
defend the set of (exotic) values that would lead to the conclusion that the relevant pain
and suffering is as bad as death itself. If WTP is not measuring welfare here, and if the
inflated numbers for cancer deaths are a product of an intuitive recoil or terror at the idea
of cancer, then regulators might not use the unrealistically high monetary values. To be
least controversial, WTP numbers would reflect informed rather than reflexive judgments
about the nature of the harms involved.
B. Persons
Even when risks are identical, people are heterogeneous in their values and their
preferences. The $6.1 million itself is the median figure—it is the median of a set of
means. But everyone agrees that in workplaces and elsewhere, individual WTP is highly
variable. Some of the variability stems from different degrees of aversion to different
risks. Some people are especially concerned to avoid the dangers associated with
pesticides, whereas others focus on the risks of air travel; some of these differences are a
product of beliefs (about existing risk levels) and others of tastes and values. So too,
those with high levels of background risk should be expected to be willing to pay less to
avoid an additional risk of 1/100,000 than those with low levels of background risk. If a
relevant population faces thirty annual mortality risks of 1/10,000 or higher, it should be
expected to show a lower VSL with respect to a new risk of 1/100,000 than a population
whose background risks are less serious.75 The difference between the VSL of people in
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wealthy nations and that of people in poor nations, taken up below, is partly a product of
the fact that the latter group generally faces far higher background risks.
It is likely that WTP varies with respect to age as well. We might well predict that
other things being equal, older people will show a lower WTP and hence a lower VSL,
simply because they have fewer years left. One study, for example, finds that the VSL of
a 48-year-old is 10 percent lower than that of a 36-year-old; another finds that people
under 45 has a VSL twenty times higher than people over 65.76 The most careful analysis
suggests that VSL peaks around age thirty, stays constant for about a decade, but declines
from that point, so much so that the VSL for a 60-year old is approximately half of that of
people from thirty to forty.77 These findings raise particular conundrums in the case of
people under eighteen, including children; how should government proceed if the VSL
for those between infancy and fifteen years of age show a tiny VSL, simply because they
have little or no money? It is implausible to use a tiny VSL for them; but what number
should be used, and why? Little progress has been made on this question,78 with the
government using its ordinary, uniform number for children as for everyone else.79 But if
we put the vexing case of valuing children to one side, then the prevailing theory suggests
a lower VSL for those at the last stages of life than for those who have many decades to
go—and that this difference ought to be reflected in regulatory policy.80
Along the same lines, many analysts have suggested that regulatory policy should
focus not on statistical lives but on statistical life-years (VSLY).81 Suppose that they are
right. If so, then the statistical lives of young people are likely to be worth more than the
statistical lives of older people. The government’s interest in focusing on VSLY led to
widespread public objections to what, under one proposal, would seem to be a “senior
death discount”—in accordance with which someone over seventy would be “worth” 58
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cents on the dollar.82 But assuming that people over 70 are willing to pay about 58%, on
average, of what people under 70 are willing to pay, the theory that underlies current
practice justifies exactly this disparity. If the theory is right (a question to which I will
turn), then a disparity between older people and younger people make perfect sense to the
extent that the WTP figures justify it.
Even more fundamentally, those with little to spare will show a far lower VSL
than those who have plenty. WTP depends on ability to pay (ATP), and when ATP is
low, WTP will of course be low as well, holding preferences constant. For this reason the
VSL of people with an annual income of $50,000 will be lower than that of people with
an annual income of $150,000. People in the former category might be willing to pay no
more than $25 to reduce a risk of 1/100,000, where people in the latter group might be
willing to pay as much as $100. If so, government should not require everyone to pay
$100; its decision to do so would harm those unwilling to pay that amount.83 A uniform
VSL, of the sort that government now uses, threatens to “overprotect” the poor, in a way
that might well be harmful to them—and also threatens to underprotect the wealthy, in a
way that is highly likely to be harmful to them.84
As a simple matter of fact, we would expect that unionized workers would receive
more compensation for incurring risks—and studies almost always show a higher VSL
for unionized workers, with amounts found to be as high as $12.3 million, $18.1 million,
and even $44.2 million.85 We would expect to find large differences across nations, with
VSL being higher in rich countries than in poor ones. And in fact, studies find a VSL as
low as $200,000 for Taiwan, $500,000 for South Korea, and $1.2 million for India—but
$21.7 million for Canada and $19 million for Australia.86 Consider, for purposes of
illustration, the following table87:
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Table 3: VSL Across Nations
Nation and year of study
Japan (1991)
South Korea (1993)
Canada (1989)
India (1996/97)
Taiwan (1997)
Australia (1997)
Hong Kong (1998)
Switzerland (2001)
United Kingdom (2000)

VSL (in 2000 US$)
$9.7 million
$0.8 million
$3.9–4.7 million
$1.2–1.5 million
$0.2–0.9 million
$11.3–19.1 million
$1.7 million
$6.3–8.6 million
$19.9 million

It would follow that within the United States, wealthy populations would show a
higher VSL than poorer populations. If a program is designed to combat health risks in
wealthy suburbs, the VSL would be above the population-wide median; if the protected
population is mostly in poor areas, the VSL would be below it. Currently agencies pay no
attention to this possibility in undertaking cost-benefit analysis.88
What about the more controversial categories of race and gender? Recent studies
show significant differences. Using workplace data from 1996 to 1998, Leeth and Ruser
find that women’s VSL ranges from $8.1 million to $10.2 million, whereas men’s VSL is
less than half that, ranging from $2.6 million to $4.7 million.89 Leeth and Ruser find that
Hispanic males show a slightly higher VSL than white males ($5 million to $3.4
million)90—and most strikingly, that African-Americans receive no compensation for
workplace risks, producing a VSL of 0.91 Using workplace data from 1992 through 1997,
Viscusi also finds a significant disparity across racial lines, though his numbers are quite
different from those found by Leeth and Ruser.92 In Viscusi’s study, the VSL is highest
for white males and lowest for African-American males, with white females and AfricanAmericans falling between the poles. More particularly, Viscusi finds that the overall
white VSL is $15 million, while the overall African-American VSL is $7.2 million.93 For
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white females, the overall VSL is $9.4 million, compared to $18.8 million for white
males; for African-American females, the overall VSL is $6.9 million, compared to $5.9
million for African-American males. Another study by Viscusi finds a VSL of $7 million
for blue-collar males and $8.5 million for blue-collar females.94 The differences between
Leeth and Ruser on the one hand and Viscusi on the other remains a puzzle. For my
purposes, the central point is that demographic differences in VSL are entirely to be
expected, and they are found in both studies.
C. Theory and Practice
If we put the foregoing points together, we can see that there is not one VSL, but
an exceptionally large number of VSLs. In fact each of us has not one VSL but a number
of them, targeted to each risk that each of us faces. A policy that truly tracks WTP would
seek to provide each person with the level of protection for which he is willing to pay to
reduce each risk. Tracking WTP is the goal that underlies current practice; and apart from
questions of administrability, it calls for a maximum level of individuation.
1. A thought experiment. As a thought experiment, suppose that an all-knowing
regulator could costlessly determine each person’s WTP for each statistical risk that she
faces—and perfectly match the level of regulatory protection to that WTP. In these
circumstances, the regulator should give each person no more and no less than his WTP
for each risk that he faces. (In cases in which people’s WTP is low because they are poor,
they might be subsidized; but they would not be forced to purchase goods for an amount
in excess of their WTP. I will return to this point,95 but subsidies are not my topic here.)
Under this approach, regulatory benefits would be treated the same as every other
commodity that is traded on markets, including safety itself. Of course most people face
extremely serious problems in dealing with risk, stemming both from an absence of
information and from bounded rationality.96 The all-knowing regulator would overcome
these problems and provide people with what they would want if they did not suffer from
them. If we could do this, then the current theory would be perfectly implemented. If so,
it would follow that with full individuation, overall WTP would be lower for poor people
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than for wealthy people, for African-Americans than for whites, and (possibly) for men
than for women. But under this thought experiment, government would not discriminate
against any group by deciding (for example) on a high VSL for programs with 95%
whites and a lower VSL for programs with 55% African-Americans. The difference
would be a product of aggregations of fully individual VSL—aggregations of the kind
that the most conventional markets, including those for automobiles and consumer goods,
now provide.
Of course there are two practical problems with taking the thought experiment
seriously. The first is that we do not know the WTP of every individual, and as a practical
matter, it is not possible to find out. The second problem is that regulatory benefits are
often collective goods—goods that cannot feasibly be provided to one without also being
provided to many. In the context of air pollution, for example, it is not possible to provide
cleaner air for some without providing cleaner air for many or all. In regulating air
pollution and water pollution, individuation is simply not an option.
These problems are fatal objections to full individuation. But they are not fatal
objections to more individuation. At a minimum, agencies should be encouraged to take
account of existing research in their sensitivity analyses, which would result (for
example) in increased “upper bound” estimates for cancer risks.97 In addition, disparities
in VSL findings might be mapped onto different agency estimates, producing reasonable
rather than arbitrary differences across agencies. If, for example, the risks of death from
workplace accidents produce a lower number than the risks of death from consumer
products, then the Occupational Safety and Health Administration might have a lower
VSL than the Consumer Product Safety Administration. We could easily imagine a
research program in which the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs attempts to
elicit far more information on VSL across different risks. A movement in this direction
need not raise troubling ethical questions.
It would be far more controversial to suggest that agencies should adopt different
VSLs depending on whether the affected population is especially wealthy or especially
poor. But at the very least, agencies should adjust VSL to changes in national wealth over
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time, producing a higher amount than would come from inflation adjustments alone.98 Or
suppose, for example, that a regulation is designed to protect migrant farmworkers,
expected to show a low VSL. Current studies in fact estimate the relationship between
income and VSL,99 allowing agencies to make suitable adjustments. And when the
population is relatively wealthy, the agency might adopt a higher VSL. For present
purposes, I am suggesting only that an approach of this kind is indicated by the theory
that government now uses. I will turn in Part IV to the larger questions that such an
approach would make it necessary to answer.
2. Optimal individuation. The larger question is simple: What is the optimal level
of individuation with respect to the value of life? The answer depends in part on how
much we know. Even in markets, individuals are not usually asked, and charged, their
particular WTP. In real estate markets, negotiation between individuals is the usual
practice. But for ordinary consumer goods—cereal, soap, casebooks, subscriptions to law
reviews—a standard price emerges from the forces of supply and demand. It seems clear
that a uniform value of life, cutting across domains in which those forces almost certainly
establish disparate amounts, fits poorly with the theory that currently underlies
government practice. It is also clear that full individuation is not feasible. The appropriate
intermediate approach depends on two familiar variables: the costs of decisions and the
costs of errors. In the early years of cost-benefit analysis, a uniform number is probably
the best that agencies could do. As better information emerges about different VSLs
across risks and persons, the use of a uniform number will be increasingly difficult to
support. And if those differences are substantial, the argument for further differentiation
will be strengthened. We might see a uniform number as a plausible “first generation”
response to the problems posed by cost-benefit analysis. The second generation is now
well underway, and hence finer distinctions will be increasingly hard to resist.
D. Administrative Law
How do these points bear on the legality of agency action? Courts have started to
develop principles by which to review agency decisions about how to assess the costs and
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benefits of regulation.100 Some statutes explicitly require agencies to balance costs
against benefits, and under such statutes the agency’s choices about valuation might be
challenged as unreasonable or arbitrary.101 If an agency used a VSL of $200,000, it would
almost certainly be assigning an arbitrarily and hence unlawfully low monetary value; if
it used a VSL of $40 million, its selection would be arbitrary high.102 In all cases the
agency is required to produce a reasonable explanation for why it has proceeded one way
rather than another.103
In view of the arguments made thus far, we could easily imagine legal challenges
to agency decisions. Suppose that the EPA continues to use the $6.1 million figure, based
on workplace studies. The agency’s decision would be vulnerable on several grounds.
First, it might be too low in light of the growth in national income. Second, it fails to
account for evidence that pollution risks, especially if cancer is involved, produce a
higher VSL than workplace risks. Third, it does not, on the facts stated, come to terms
with the possibility that the protected group is wealthier or poorer than the group
involved in the workplace studies. All of these challenges are plausible under existing
law. As new and better data emerge, they become stronger still. It is certainly possible
than a decade from now, the use of a uniform figure will seem obtuse, even indefensible.
Is there anything than agencies might say in response? They might urge that the
existing evidence is too ambiguous and contestable to justify a change in current practice.
Most studies based on more recent data find a VSL in the range of $6.1 million.104 With
respect to cancer, EPA’s Science Advisory Board (SAB) rejected an upward revision for
especially dread illnesses, finding that the existing literature does not justify any such
revision; and some evidence directly supports the view of the SAB.105 To be sure, it is
more than plausible to think that VSL is wealth-dependent; but EPA might urge that a
uniform number is preferable on moral and distributive grounds and not greatly out of
line with existing evidence. In any case, a single number might have the advantage of
easy administrability—and produce results that in general would be the same as those
100

The leading case is Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). See also American
Dental Association v. Martin, 984 F.2d (7th Cir. 1993).
101
See, e.g., 15 USC 2601© (Toxic Substances Control Act).
102
This is an implication of Corrosion Proof Fittings, supra note.
103
Id.
104
See, e.g., Leeth and Ruser, supra note.
105
See Viscusi and Aldy, supra note 57.
26

produced by imaginable variations. Most of the time, the agency’s choice will not be
affected if it selects a VSL of $3.5 million or $10 million; if so, a uniform number would
seem acceptable.
In many cases, I believe that these responses are unconvincing as a matter of
policy. But in light of the properly limited role of courts in the oversight of agency action,
they are convincing as a matter of law.106 Courts should allow agencies considerable
room to maneuver here, at least until the evidence against a uniform number becomes
overwhelming. Permission to adopt such a number has an important corollary: An agency
would be on firm legal ground if it attempted to make adjustments of the sort I have
suggested, even if current evidence does not unambiguously support those adjustments.
IV. Why WTP? Easy Cases, Hard Cases
Thus far I have assumed that the theory behind current practice is straightforward—
that it depends on an empirical elicitation of people’s WTP as the foundation for VSL. If
the assumption is correct, then a high degree of individuation is justified. But perhaps the
assumption is false. Perhaps the prevailing theory does rely on elicited WTP, but also
adopts a norm in favor of the equality of persons (and possibly mortality risks as well).107
Might that more complex theory be correct? In any case, what is the argument for
embodying people’s actual WTP in regulatory policy? Why should anyone care about
actual WTP at all? Why should government conduct cost-benefit analysis with close
reference to VSL108?
A. Easy Cases
Let us begin with easy cases. For the sake of simplicity, assume a society in
which people face multiple risks of 1/100,000, and in which every person is both
adequately informed and willing to pay no more and no less than $60 to eliminate each of
those risks. Assume too that the cost of eliminating these 1/100,000 risks is widely
variable, ranging from close to zero to many billions. Assume finally that the cost of
eliminating any risk is borne entirely by those who benefit from risk elimination. Under
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that assumption, regulation imposes the equivalent of user’s fee; for example, people’s
water bills will entirely reflect the costs of a policy that eliminates a 1/100,000 of getting
cancer from arsenic in drinking water. If the per-person cost is $100, each water bill will
be increased by exactly that amount.
1. The straightforward argument. With these assumptions, the argument for using
WTP is straightforward. Regulation amounts to a forced exchange; it tells people that
they must purchase certain benefits for a certain amount. Why should government force
people to pay for things that they do not want? By hypothesis, a forced exchange on
terms that people dislike will make them worse off. The case for using WTP depends on
the simple idea that government should make Pareto-superior moves (those that make at
least one person better off without making anyone worse off) and that it should avoid
making Pareto-inferior moves (those that make at least one person worse off without
making anyone better off). At first glance, use of WTP and VSL, on the assumptions I am
making, seems hard to contest.109 For purposes of evaluating regulation, it does not
matter if the existing distribution of income is unjust or if poor people are, in an
intelligible sense, coerced to run certain risks. The remedy for unjust distributions, and
for that form of coercion, is not to require people to buy regulatory benefits on terms that
they find unacceptable.
Consider how this argument works with respect to risks and persons. Suppose that
people are willing to pay no more than $50 to avoid a 1/100,000 risk of dying in a car
crash, but they are willing up to $100 to avoid a 1/100,000 risk of dying of cancer. If
government uses a WTP for both risks of $75, it will force people to pay more than they
want to avoid the risks associated with airplane crashes, and less than they want to avoid
risks of cancer. Why should government do that? And if the argument is convincing in
this example, it should apply in numerous cases in which WTP and VSL vary across
risks.
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With respect to persons, the argument is more controversial, above all because it
treats poor people as less valuable (literally) than poor people. But at least at first glance,
differences are appropriate here as well. The reason is not that poor people are less
valuable than rich people. It is that no one, rich or poor, should be forced to pay more
than they are willing to pay for the reduction of risks. This idea embodies a norm of
equality. And if poor people are unwilling to pay much for the reduction of serious risks,
the appropriate response is not a compelled purchase, but a subsidy. Suppose, for
example, that each member of a group of relatively poor people, earning less than
$30,000 annually, is willing to pay only $25 to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000—about onehalf, let us suppose, of the nation’s population-wide median of $50. Should regulators
require every citizen, including those in the relatively poor group, to pay $50? In
principle, the government should force exchanges only on terms that people find
acceptable, at least if it is genuinely concerned with their welfare.
Does the easy case seem implausibly unrealistic? In many contexts, it certainly is.
The costs of air pollution regulation are not fully borne by its beneficiaries.110 But for
workers’ compensation regulation, the situation is very different: Nonunionized workers
faced a dollar-for-dollar wage reduction, corresponding almost perfectly to the expected
value of the benefits they received.111 For drinking water regulation, something similar is
involved. The cost of regulations is passed onto consumers in the form of higher water
bills.112 Hence the easy case finds a number of real-world analogues.
2. Objections. There are several possible objections. They point to some important
qualifications, but none of them is a convincing refutation of the straightforward
argument.
(a) Adaptive preferences and “miswanting.” The first objection would emphasize
the possibility that people’s preferences have adapted to existing opportunities, including
deprivation.113 Perhaps people show a low WTP for environmental goods, including
health improvements, simply because they have adjusted to environmental bads,
including health risks. Perhaps people’s WTP reflects an effort to reduce cognitive
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dissonance through the conclusion that risks are lower than they actually are.114 To
generalize the objection, perhaps people suffer from a problem of “miswanting”115; they
want things that do not promote their welfare, and they do not want things that would
promote their welfare. If this is so, then WTP loses much of its underlying justification;
people’s decisions do not actually promote their welfare.116 And if government can be
confident that people are not willing to pay for goods from which they would greatly
benefit, then government should abandon WTP.
In some contexts, this objection raises serious problems for neoclassical
economics and for unambivalent enthusiasm for freedom of choice. But in the context of
ordinary regulatory policy, this objection has more theoretical than practical interest.
Typically we are speaking here of steps that would reduce low level mortality risks (say,
1/50,000) and here there is no reason to believe that the use of informed WTP (say, $100)
is a product of adaptive preferences.
(b) Inadequate information and bounded rationality. A closely related objection
would point to an absence of information and to bounded rationality. People have a
notoriously difficult time in dealing with low-probability events.117 If people are not
aware of what they might be gaining by regulation, their WTP might be too low. And if
people are unable to understand the meaning of ideas like “1 in 50,000,” or to respond
rationally to such ideas, then there are serious problems with relying on WTP. In
imaginable circumstances, this is a serious difficulty for the use of WTP and VSL.
Perhaps people’s WTP reflects excessive discounting of future health benefits; if workers
are ignoring the future, or applying an implausibly high discount rate, then there is a good
argument for putting their WTP to one side.
By hypothesis, however, there is no such problem here. We are dealing with cases
in which WTP is a result of adequate information and in which bounded rationality is not
leading people to err. In any case the relevant numbers come from contingent valuation
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studies or market evidence in which decisions are adequately informed. If not,
appropriate adjustments should be made.
(c) Rights. A quite different objection would point to people’s rights. Perhaps
people have a right not to be subjected to risks of a certain magnitude, and the use of
WTP will violate those rights. And it does seem fully reasonable to say that whatever
their WTP, human beings should have a right not to be subject to risks above a particular
level. Imagine, for example, that poor people live in a place where they face a 1/20
annual risk of dying from water pollution; it makes sense to say that the government
should reduce that risk even if people are willing to pay only $1 to eliminate it and the
per-person cost is $100.118
As an abstract claim about people’s rights, the objection is entirely correct.
Something has gone badly wrong if people are exposed to serious risks and if their WTP
prevents them, and is invoked to prevent their government, from doing anything in
response. It would be foolish to suggest that WTP is determinative of the appropriate use
of government subsidies; a redistributive policy hardly tracks people’s WTP. (Would it
make sense to say that government will give poor people a check for $100 only if they
are willing to pay $100 for the check?) And in many cases people are subject to risks
whose magnitude is indeed a violation of rights. But this point has little force against the
particular argument I am making. The initial problem is that in the cases under
discussion, rights of this kind are usually not involved; we are speaking here of
statistically small risks. Suppose that this response is unconvincing and that rights are
indeed involved. If so, there is a still more fundamental point. When rights are involved,
the proper response is not to force people to buy protection that they do not want, but to
provide a subsidy that will give them the benefit for free or enable them to receive the
benefit at what is, for them, an acceptable price.119 Nothing here is meant to deny the
possibility that government should provide certain goods via subsidy, or indeed that
subjection to risks above a certain level is a violation of rights.120 The question here is
118
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one of regulation under the stated assumptions. So long as that is the question, use of
WTP does not violate anyone’s rights.
(d) Democracy vs. markets. An independent objection would stress that people
are citizens, not merely consumers; it would urge that regulatory choices should be made
after citizens have deliberated with one another about their preferences and values.121 The
argument against forced exchanges treats people as consumers; it sees their decisions
about safety as the same as their decisions about all other commodities. For some
decisions, this approach is badly misconceived.122 Our constitutional system is a
deliberative democracy,123 not a maximization machine, and many social judgments
should be made by citizens engaged in deliberative discussion with one another rather
than by aggregating the individual choices of consumers.124
In the context of racial and sex discrimination, for example, the legal system does
not aggregate people’s WTP; the level of discrimination is not set by using market
evidence or contingent valuation studies to see how much people would be willing to pay
to discriminate (or to be free from discrimination). So too, the prohibition on sexual
harassment does not emerge from asking anything about WTP. Through political
processes, citizens have decided that certain forms of discrimination are illicit, whatever
people’s WTP. The protection of endangered species might be understood in similar
terms. On reasonable assumptions, it would make little sense to aggregate people’s
willingness to pay in deciding in deciding whether and when to protect members of
endangered species; this is a moral question to be resolved through democratic
discussion, not through exercises in consumer sovereignty. The question of animal
welfare is closely analogous. Laws that forbid cruelty to animals, and that impose
affirmative duties of protection on human beings, stem not from anything involving
WTP, but from a belief that moral commitments call for them.125 Thus Amartya Sen
emphasizes that “discussions and exchange, and even political arguments, contribute to
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the formation and revision of values,”126 and urges that in the particular context of
environmental protection, solutions require us “to go beyond looking only for the best
reflection of existing individual preferences, or the most acceptable procedures for
choices based on those preferences.”127
These claims are both fundamental and correct; they point to some serious
limitations on the use of WTP for purposes of policy. But it is important not to read such
objections for more than they are worth. In trading off safety and health in our own
private lives, we do not have static values and preferences. Much of the time, our choices
are a product of reflection, even if we are simply acting as consumers. Reflection and
deliberation, including reflection and deliberation with others, is hardly absent from the
market domain. To be sure, moral questions are not to be resolved by aggregating private
willingness to pay. Sometimes people’s preferences, even though backed by WTP, are
morally off-limits, and policy should not take account of them. In addition, people are
sometimes unwilling to pay a great deal for goods that have strong moral justifications;
animal welfare is an example. In these circumstances, the market model is inapplicable.
But do these arguments suggest that government should override individual
choices about how much to spend to eliminate low-level risks, even when those choices
are adequately informed? For environmental protection generally, it is indeed important
to go beyond “the best reflection of existing individual preferences.” But this point does
not mean that people should be required to pay (say) $100 to eliminate mortality risks of
1/100,000 when they are willing to pay only $75. If people’s WTP reflects an absence of
information or insufficient deliberation, then it is important for other people, in
government as elsewhere, to draw their attention to that fact. And in some cases, a low
WTP might be overridden on the ground that it is rooted in errors, factual or otherwise.
But these points should not be taken as a general objection to governmental reluctance to
force people to reduce statistical risks at an expense that they deem excessive. Here is one
way to understand the argument I am making: Ours is a deliberative democracy, to be
sure, but in that democracy, it is valuable for regulators to consider more fully
individuated VSLs in deciding how to proceed, at least under the stated assumptions.
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(e) Very low probabilities and catastrophic risks. Suppose that everyone in the
United States faces an annual death risk of 1/10,000,000—and that the risk, if it comes to
fruition, will kill every person in the country. The expected number of annual deaths is
26, which would produce expected annual costs in excess of $158 million, assuming a
VSL of $6.1 million. But if we attempt to elicit each individual’s WTP to avoid a risk of
1/10,000,000, we might well produce a number very close to zero—yielding both 26
expected annual fatalities and expected annual costs very close to zero. This seems to be
an anomaly; is it really sensible to conclude that the prevention of 26 deaths is worth
nothing? A fully ex ante perspective, based on people’s WTP to avoid very low
probability risks, suggests an affirmative answer. But assigning a value near zero, for the
prevention of dozens of deaths, seems quite implausible. In cases of this kind, we seem to
find a serious problem with the ex ante perspective on VSL.
This conclusion understates the problem. In the case at hand, the risk is
potentially catastrophic; if the 1/10,000,000 chance comes through, every American will
be dead. Even if people show a WTP near zero to avoid a risk of that size, it does not
seem right to think that the nation should spend almost nothing to prevent it.128 The point
has a general bearing on precautions against low probability risks of catastrophe: Some
degree of prevention is justified even if WTP numbers do not justify them. Part of the
problem with those numbers is that if individual behavior is consulted, it will not reflect a
“catastrophe premium” or “extermination premium” that would almost certainly emerge
if it were possible to test for it. But part of the problem may be that WTP is not an
adequate measure of social responses to catastrophes, perhaps because people are not
familiar with making choices about risks of that sort.
I believe that this is a sound objection to the use of a (low or near-zero) VSL in
the context of catastrophic risks, even if the WTP numbers justify that VSL. But this is an
extremely limited objection; it does not apply to the overwhelming number of cases in
which VSL is used.
(f) Third party effects. A final objection would point to effects on third parties. If
outsiders would be adversely affected, and if their welfare is not being considered, then
the WTP calculus is seriously incomplete. This point creates a general and badly
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neglected problem for WTP as it is currently used: Agencies consider people’s WTP to
eliminate statistical risks, without taking account of the fact that others—especially
family members and close friends—would also be willing to pay something to eliminate
those risks. John might be willing to pay $25 to eliminate his own risk of 1/100,000, but
his wife Jane might be willing to pay $25 to eliminate John’s risk too; if we add the
WTP, on John’s behalf, of John’s friends and relatives, the total WTP might soon exceed
$100. This point is a real problem for existing uses of WTP.
But we are stipulating that there are no third party effects here. The argument for
using WTP, on the stated assumptions, is that government should not force people to buy
goods that are not worthwhile for them. At least at first glance, this argument seems
sound with respect to statistical risks of the kind on which I am focusing here.129
B. WTP and Easy Cases: Demographic Differences, International Differences
1. Rich and poor. Suppose that poor people are willing to pay only $20 to
eliminate a statistical risk of 1/100,000, but that wealthy people are willing to pay $60. It
would follow that the VSL would be lower for poor people than for wealthy people—and
that a regulatory policy that focuses on WTP would provide a higher VSL for wealthy
people ($6 million) than for poor people ($2 million). Is this unjust or unfair to poor
people? On the current assumptions, it is not. Government should not force poor people
to buy more than their WTP to eliminate statistical risks; forced exchanges of this kind do
poor people no good and some harm. It is tempting to justify a uniform VSL, one that
does not distinguish between rich and poor, on the ground that it embodies a form of risk
equity, treating every person as no more and no less than one130 and redistributing
resources in the direction of poor people. But this is an error. A uniform WTP, taken (let
us suppose) from a population-wide median, does not produce redistribution toward the
poor, any more than any other kind of forced exchange. Government does not require
people to buy Volvos, even though Volvos would reduce statistical risks. If government
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required everyone to buy Volvos, it would not be producing desirable redistribution.131 A
uniform VSL has some of the same characteristics as a policy that requires people to buy
Volvos.
2. Rich countries, poor countries. The point has significant implications for global
risk regulation. I have suggested that people in poor nations show a lower VSL than
people in wealthy nations.132 Building on evidence of this kind, some assessments of the
effects of global warming find far higher monetized costs from deaths of people in rich
countries than from deaths of people in poor countries.133 In its Second Report in 1995,
the International Panel on Climate Change calculated that a life in an industrialized
country was worth $1.5 million, while a life in a developing country was worth only
$150,000.134 These assessments have been highly controversial; John Broome, for
example, notes that under this approach, an American life is worth 10 or 20 Indian lives,
a judgment that he deems “absurd.”135 Hence some analysts, including the International
Panel, have opted for a world-wide VSL of $1 million, a choice that seems quite arbitrary
and potentially harmful to people in rich nations and poor ones alike. The problem raises
important dilemmas.
a. Abstract values? How should global institutions assess the monetary value of
human lives? What are the monetized costs of (say) 10,000 worldwide deaths from global
warming, deaths that include (say) 8000 people from poor countries and 2000 from
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wealthy ones? The discussion thus far suggests that there is no sensible abstract answer to
these questions; we have to know what, in particular, the answer is for. If a general
question is asked, outside of any particular context, about the monetary value of a stated
number of deaths in 2020, it is best unanswered (except perhaps with laughter). The
appropriate assessments of VSL, and variations across countries, depends on their
intended use. If disparate numbers are meant to identify the actual monetary values of
human lives, and to suggest that people in Canada are “worth” much more than people in
Argentina or that poor people are “worth” less than rich ones, they are ludicrous as well
as offensive.
We can go further. If the disparate numbers are meant to suggest the appropriate
amount that donor institutions should spend to reduce mortality risks, they make little
sense. The fact that a poor person in a poor nation would be willing to pay $1 to eliminate
a risk of 1/10,000, whereas a wealthy person in a wealthy nation would be willing to pay
$100, cannot plausibly be used to defend the view that an international agency should
devote its resources to the latter rather than the former. To see the point, suppose that you
are asked to choose between two programs:
(A) Program A would eliminate (at a stated cost to you of $500) a 1/10,000 risk
faced by fifty poor people in Costa Rica, each willing to pay $2 to eliminate that
risk.
(B) Program B would eliminate (also at a stated cost of $500) a 1/10,000 risk faced
by fifty wealthy people in Berlin, each willing to pay $350 to eliminate that
same risk.
In principle, there is no reason to think that you should prefer to save the
Berliners, even those their VSL is far higher. In fact Program A has much higher priority,
because it would help people who are facing extreme deprivation. What is true at the
individual level is true across nations as well.
(b) VSL in poor countries. But imagine that the government in a poor nation is
deciding on appropriate policy to reduce workplace risks. At least under the assumptions
I have given thus far, such a government would do well to begin by using the admittedly
low WTP of its own citizens. If citizens in that nation show a WTP of $2 to eliminate
risks of 1/10,000, then their government does them no favors by requiring them to pay
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$50 or $10. This is the sense in which VSL properly varies across nations, and in which
citizens of poor nations have a lower VSL than citizens of wealthy ones. The point has
strong implications for international labor standards. It is tempting to suggest that
workers in poor countries, for example China and India, should receive the same
protection as those in the United States; why should a worker in Beijing be subject to
significantly higher death risks than a worker in Los Angeles?
As a matter of basic principle, there is no good answer to this question. But as a
matter of regulatory policy, the answer is straightforward. So long as the distribution of
global income has the form that it does, a system that gives Chinese workers the same
protection as American workers is not in the interest of Chinese workers—assuming, as
we are, that the cost of that protection is borne by workers themselves. Requiring Chinese
workers to have the same protection as Americans amounts to a forced exchange on
terms that Chinese workers reject. The idea that workers in poor nations should have the
“same” protection as workers in wealthy nations is an error, rooted in a moral heuristic
involving the equal worth of all human lives—a heuristic that sometimes works well but
that also misfires.136
Note, once again, that the argument for using WTP does not imply satisfaction
with the existing distribution of wealth. We might believe that the existing distribution is
unjust and that it should be dramatically changed. The problem with forced exchanges is
that they do nothing to alter existing distributions. In fact they make poor people worse
off, requiring them to use their limited resources for something that they do not want to
buy.
C. Harder Cases: Kaldor-Hicks and Welfare
There is an obvious artificiality in the assumptions thus far. Most important,
people do not always bear the full social costs of the regulatory benefits they receive.
Sometimes they pay only a fraction of those costs—or possibly even nothing at all. When
this is so, the normative analysis is much more complicated. In the context of air
pollution regulation, for example, there is a complex set of distributional effects, and on
balance, poor people, and members of minority communities, appear to be net gainers.137
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An efficiency analysis, based on WTP, might not produce an adequate account of the
welfare effects of air pollution regulation. And even if it does, an account of welfare
effects might not end the normative question, because the distributional gains are
important to consider.138 The difficulty is that a high VSL, one that exceeds what WTP
studies show for poor people, might produce outcomes that are in the best interest of poor
people, in the sense that the result is a welfare improvement for them.139 Note that these
points do not bear directly on the question whether VSL should vary across risks. But
they do bear on the issue of varying VSL across persons, and in particular across
differences that result from disparities in income and wealth.
Suppose, for example, that beneficiaries of a proposed drinking water regulation
are willing to pay only $80 to eliminate a risk of 1/80,000 in drinking water; that the perperson cost of eliminating a 1/50,000 risk is $100; but that for every dollar of that cost,
the beneficiaries pay only 80 cents. The remaining 20 cents might be paid by water
companies themselves, in the form of reduced profits, or by employees of the water
companies, in the form of reduced wages and fewer jobs. In this example, the costs of the
regulation exceed the benefits; it is inefficient. But by hypothesis, the regulation makes
its beneficiaries of the regulation better off. If the WTP criterion is used, the fact that the
monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits is decisive. But as a normative matter, the
analysis here is far harder than in the easy cases. On what assumption should the WTP
numbers be decisive?
The assumption must be that economic efficiency is the goal of government, at
least in the context of regulation—that in order to know what to do, we should aggregate
the benefits and costs of regulation, and act if and only if the benefits exceed the costs.
When using the WTP numbers, government is acting as a maximization machine,
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The Office of Management and Budget has expressly recognized this point in its most recent guidelines
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there is no parallel discussion for regulation of the sort I am discussing here. My suggestion is that under
imaginable assumptions, some such regulation will be defensible on distributive grounds.
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aggregating all benefits and costs as measured by the WTP criterion. But this is a highly
contestable understanding of what government should be doing. In fact it represents a
shift from the relatively uncontroversial Pareto criterion, exemplified above, to a version
of the far more controversial Kaldor-Hicks criterion,140 which assesses policy by asking
this question: Are the gainers winning more than the losers are losing? The Kaldor-Hicks
criterion is sometimes described as potential Pareto superiority,141 because it asks
whether in principle, the winners could compensate the losers, and a surplus could be left
over. The difficulty of course is that Pareto superiority is merely potential. Some people
really are losing and others are gaining.
In the harder cases, the gainers are gaining less (in monetary terms) than the
losers are losing—and hence the regulation is said to be unjustified. Under the
assumptions I have given, the regulation is indeed inefficient: Its social cost is higher
than its social benefit. But is the regulation undesirable? This is not at all clear. The first
problem is that WTP is measuring gains and loses in monetary terms, rather than in
welfare terms.142 It is possible that those who gain, in the harder cases, gain more welfare
than the losers lose; WTP is not dispositive on that question. The second problem is
distributional. Suppose that in terms of overall welfare, the regulation is not desirable; it
makes aggregate welfare lower rather than higher. But suppose too that those who benefit
are more advantaged than those who lose. If, for example, those who are willing to pay
$80 are disproportionately poor, and those who pay the remainder are disproportionately
wealthy, the regulation might be plausibly justified despite the welfare loss.
It is natural to respond here that if redistribution is what is sought, then it should
be produced not through regulation but through the tax system, which is a more efficient
way of transferring resources to those who need help.143 I agree. But suppose that
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redistribution is not going to happen through the tax system. If so, then the regulation in
the harder cases cannot be ruled off-limits despite its inefficiency.
Return finally to the use of VSL in poor nations in the regulatory context that is
my principal focus here. Suppose that in such nations, VSL turns out to be $100,000. If
relevant governments use a VSL of $6 million, on the theory that their citizens should not
be valued less than those of wealthy nations, social harm will almost inevitably result. In
the easy cases, the forced exchanges will be ludicrously harmful to the people they are
supposed to help. In the hard cases, where the beneficiaries pay only a fraction of the
cost, such a nation will be spending far too much of its money on risk reduction (or more
precisely, on reducing the risks that happen to get onto the regulatory agenda). The
inefficiency of an extremely high VSL will be felt acutely and in many forms, including
decreased employment. But if the costs of risk reduction will be paid by third parties—
for example, wealthy nations—then the people in that poor country will be helped even if
risk reduction is based on an excessive VSL.
Of course they would almost certainly be helped more if they were given cash
(supposing that it would not be squandered) rather than in-kind benefits. But if cash
redistribution is not possible, regulatory benefits, provided for free or for a fraction of
their cost, remain a blessing. If, for example, a global institution uses a world-wide VSL
of $1 million, and if that amount exceeds the domestic VSL of people in poor nations, it
is possible that poor people will gain a greater deal if the resources for risk-reduction are
provided by wealthy nations. In the harder cases, the simple point is that many of the
intended beneficiaries of regulation are in fact net gainers.
D. Harder Cases as Easy Ones, and VSL Again
Is there a reason to treat the harder cases as identical to the easy ones? Is this
absurd144? Agencies do not distinguish between them, although recent guidelines, calling

redistribute income); David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 439, 439–40 (2003) (“[T]he tax system is a better tool for redistribution of income than legal
rules.”).
144
See Broome, supra note, at 121. Broome urges that “there are separate reasons why preferences are an
unsatisfactory basis for valuing lives,” including the fact that “in contexts involving risks, people’s
preferences are generally muddled and incoherent” rather than rational. Id. at 122. If preferences are in fact
muddled and incoherent, current practice is of course on thin ground.
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agencies to attend to distributional issues, might eventually encourage them to do so.145 A
possible reason for treating the harder cases as the easy ones is optimistic: Perhaps
everything will balance out in the end. Perhaps no group will be systematically helped or
hurt, and the tax system will be used to produce appropriate redistribution. In the realworld domestic cases, we might also think that a direct inquiry into welfare, bypassing
WTP, would be extremely difficult or perhaps even impossible to operationalize. If
distributional considerations are deemed relevant, interest-group warfare might be the
consequence, rather than distribution to those who particularly need and deserve help.146
More modestly, we might conclude that agencies should generally pursue efficiency,
using VSL as the foundation for decisions, but should allow distributional findings to cut
the other way in cases in which there is compelling reason to allow them to do so. In fact
this approach is a plausible way of reading OMB’s current guidelines on regulatory
impact analysis.147
Let us return in this light to VSL. In the easy cases, the resulting redistribution is
almost certainly perverse, because forced exchanges, under the stated assumptions, are
highly likely to harm the people who are being coerced. But in the harder cases, it cannot
be said that the beneficiaries of regulation will be harmed if government uses a number
that exceeds their actual VSL. Everything depends on the distributional effects of the
regulation. If the beneficiaries are well-off, a high VSL might produce perverse
redistribution if those who lose are toward the bottom of the economic ladder. We could
imagine this result, for example, with a pollution program that protects those who visit
expensive recreational areas. If the beneficiaries are poor, and if the costs are born by the
wealthy or more generally, a high VSL might be in the interest of those who need help.
Air pollution programs, providing special protection for those in cities, appear to be an
example.148 We can therefore reject the confident view of economically inclined analysts
who believe that accurate VSLs, based on actual WTP (and hence individuated), should
always be the basis of regulatory policy. But we can also reject the confident view of
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skeptics who believe that a uniform WTP, refusing to make distinctions among persons,
is best on distributive grounds.
What are the implications for individuation of VSL? It remains true that according
to the theory that underlies agency valuations, a higher degree of individuation would be
desirable. It also remains true that with respect to risks, individuation is appropriate
insofar as valuations differ depending on the nature of the risk at stake. The principal
qualification is that a uniform VSL, one that gives disadvantaged people regulatory
protection in excess of their WTP, might turn out to have fortunate distributional
consequences in the harder cases. We should be careful about this point. It will not
always hold, and if the goal is to provide more assistance to those in need, a uniform VSL
is hardly the best way to achieve that goal. Consider the case of poor nations: a
worldwide VSL, adopted by each nation, of $6.1 million would almost certainly be
harmful, simply because the resulting levels of regulation would have such adverse
effects on wages and employment levels. (In these circumstances it is unsurprising that
workers in wealthy nations, not in poor ones, often clamor the loudest for greater
protection of workers in poor nations; workers in wealthier nations would be the principal
beneficiaries of such regulation, which would protect them against competition from
those in poorer nations.) My only point is that in some cases, individuation across persons
will produce worse outcomes on distributional grounds and possibly on grounds of
welfare as well.
How, then, should global institutions, like the International Panel on Climate
Change, assess the monetary costs of risks faced by people all over the world? As I have
suggested, the answer turns on the purpose of the assessment—on what issue the answer
is supposed to be addressing. There is no good acontextual way of deciding on the
aggregate costs of global climate change by 2050; actually that is a ludicrous question,
because it does not (as stated) have any point. A far more sensible question is whether it
would make sense for any particular nation to accept a particular way of responding to
the problem, such as the Kyoto Protocol.149 At the national level, an assessment of the
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costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol is not much different from an assessment of the
costs and benefits of any other regulation. If the risk of death, as a result of climate
change, is in the neighborhood of 1 in 100,000, then the ordinary framework applies, with
appropriate individuation across both risks and persons.150 For wealthy nations, the
argument for signing the Kyoto Protocol is strengthened by the fact that the harms of
global warming will be felt disproportionately in poor nations,151 and also by the fact that
wealthy nations have done by far the most to produce the situation that makes global
warming a serious problem. An analysis of these questions would make it necessary to go
far beyond the present topic. My goal here has been to suggest that within nations,
diverse VSL are perfectly sensible, and that answers to questions about valuation must be
closely attuned to the purposes for which those questions are being asked.
Conclusion
The theory that animates current valuations of mortality risks argues in favor of
far more individuation. A uniform VSL cannot possibly cut across all risks and all
individuals. Does the risk involve cancer? What kind of cancer? Does it involve air
pollution or driving on the highways? It is obtuse to adopt an approach that values all
statistically equivalent mortality risks in the same way. In addition, individuals display a
great deal of heterogeneity in their VSL—not simply because of different tastes and
values, but also because of different levels of income and wealth. Willingness to pay
depends on ability to pay. Nothing I have said here is meant to suggest approval of
existing distributions of resources. Of course poor people are not “worth less” than
wealthy ones, and it is often appropriate for government to provide resources directly to
poor people or instead to subsidize the provision of regulatory benefits. But forced
exchanges are not a good way to assist poor people, and a uniform VSL is often a
perverse response to inequality. In theory, risk reduction policies should be more fully
individuated, giving each person regulatory protection that corresponds to his WTP for
the particular risk in question.
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Of course this is not practicable. Government lacks the necessary information
about individual risk preferences; categorical judgments are inevitable. In any case many
of the benefits provided by regulation are collective in character. Regulators cannot
feasibly provide protection to one person without simultaneously providing protection to
many. But it is nonetheless important to see what the current theory counsels in principle,
and to understand that the limitations are practical ones, some of which might be
overcome as knowledge progresses. And even with the practical limitations, a uniform
VSL is increasingly difficult to justify.
We know enough to know that some risks produce a higher VSL than others—a
judgment that would produce significantly different analyses in many cases, above all by
producing a higher VSL for cancer risks. A program that protects old people will produce
a lower VSL than one that protects younger people, and there is no ethical objection to
variations on the basis of age.152 And if a program affects mostly wealthy people, a VSL
based on the population-wide median will be too low. It would follow that the Federal
Aviation Administration should have a relatively high VSL, because people who fly are
wealthier than the population median—and when the EPA is engaging in cost-benefit
analysis for programs protecting poor people from risks associated with hazardous waste
sites, it should have a relatively low VSL.
The principal qualification here is that when the beneficiaries of regulation do not
pay all of its cost, a high VSL may actually be in their interests. The easy cases, in which
the beneficiaries are forced to pay for regulatory benefits, are not the same as those in
which they pay only a fraction of the cost. Nonetheless, current practice treats them as
identical, perhaps because of the great difficulty in untangling the incidence of regulatory
benefits and costs. My goal has not been to resolve that difficulty, but to suggest that the
theory behind current practice justifies far more individuation of VSL than regulators
currently provide. However we deal with distributional problems and the hardest cases,
the use of a uniform VSL is unacceptably obtuse.
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